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BOOK REVIEWS
organized crusade, and more than he, they are willing to use
the Court to promote the public policies in which they believe.
Walter P. Armstrongt
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY. Volume
II. Foreign Corporations: Torts: Contracts in Gen-
eral. By Ernst Rabel.* Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press; Chicago: Callaghan & Company, 1947.
(Michigan Legal Studies.) Pp. xli, 705. $8.00.
Sincere tribute must be paid to Ernst Rabel for his
new book on Conflict of Laws.1 Like his earlier volume on
the sale of goods, this work again reveals the author's vast
knowledge and, wide experience, and it demonstrates both
his unerring capacity for clear thought and his mastery over
an immense wealth of material. The statutory and case law
of all the countries of Europe and the Americas, as well as
of all States belonging to the British Commonwealth of
Nations, form the rich and variegated background of his work.
In assembling his material he enjoyed the help afforded by
incomparable law libraries and the invaluable assistance of
many gifted lawyers. But it is his own energy, his own
creative ideas, and his own sure touch that have woven the
immense mass of raw material into the finished tapestry;
that have transformed innumerable single "foreign" laws
into a true "comparison of laws." The value of such com-
parison is much more evident in every chapter of his book
than in all the numerous apologetic and methodological es-
t Member, Tennessee Bar Association (Pres. 1936); Member, Ameri-
can Bar Association (Pres. 1941-2).
Research Associate, University of Michigan Law School. Some-
time Professor of Law, University of Berlin, and Director of the
Institut der Kaiser Wilhelm Gesellschaft fur auslandisches und
internationales Privatrecht, Berlin.
1. The first volume of Rabel's work, published in 1945, dealt in the
Introduction not only with the historical background, the liter-
ature, the sources, and the "structure" of conflict rules (where
Rabel's well-known views on classification were repeated) but
also with what the author calls "Development of Conflicts Law."
By this phrase he understands certain general principles and
methods, such as "misuse Of logic," Tenvoi, autonomy of the parties,
the tendency to uniformity, "specialization" of conflict rules, and
internationalization. Parts Two to Five of the first volume discuss
the personal law of individuals (including determination of domi-
cil and nationality); marriage; divorce and annulment; and
parental relations.
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says, lectures, discourses and reviews that have been pub-
lished at various times and places.
One may be inclined to oppose some of the author's views
on the practical uses of comparative law. Thus it seems to
the reviewer that the author overestimates the value of
comparative law in the field of classification (or character-
ization, as he calls it), and the reviewer shares Lepaulle's
recent pertinent criticism of Rabel's classification doctrine.2
But that is a particular point, and one which theorists
have been inclined to stress unduly.
The second volume of Rabel's work-which forms the
subject of this review-deals with three topics: corporations,
torts, and contracts in general.
In the first topic, corporations and kindred organiza-
tions, the author describes the various kinds of organizations
to be found in any legal system. He contrasts legal persons
(corporations and foundations) with unincorporated associa-
tions (partnerships and nonincorporated nonprofit associa-
tions) and mere "contracts of joint undertaking" (that is,
merely contractual arrangements). This last group appar-
ently includes societies with a sleeping partner (the stille
Gesellschaft of German law). He uses the term organization
to cover all these types-even those mere contractual ar-
rangements in which there is nothing to be organized. He
outlines further the characteristics of those types of organi-
zations where corporate and partnership elements are mixed,
such as de facto corporations or the unincorporated associa-
tions of German civil law, and he stresses the fact that it is
the "corporate element" in such mixed types which allows
private international law to ascribe to them a personal law.3
These foundations of civil law countries are comparable to
the charitable trusts of common law countries which-like
foundations-should, in the author's view, be localized at the
place of management rather than at the situs of the assets.
The famous problem of the nationality of corporations
is satisfactorily solved. The extreme variation in the rules
relating to the personal law of "foreign" corporations and
their recognition, in addition to the widely differing pro-
visions of administrative, procedural, fiscal, and penal law
which are applied to such corporations makes it impossible
2. See LEPAULLE, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE (1948).
3. Pp. 10-100.
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to set up or follow an identical criterion of nationality. A
uniform solution is therefore unattainable. The so-called
Argentine doctrine according to which legal persons are
neither national nor foreign, and in consequence cannot claim
diplomatic intervention, is not favoured by the author.4
In dealing with the personal law of business corpora-
tions, Dr. Rabel describes the two rival principles of the
common law system, according to which the law of the state
of incorporation is decisive, and the civil law system, under
which the law of the place of central control is applicable.
He adds, however, that "The true point of difference between
the two systems is not that under the one incorporation is
sufficient, and in the other the situation of the main office
would suffice to determine the personal law. . . . The re-
quirement of domicil is additional to that of incorporation
and does not by any means replace it."" The author does
not say what in his opinion is the "true point of difference"
between the two systems.6 The theory that in certain cir-
cumstances the personal law and the nationality of a com-
pany are determined neither by incorporation nor by the
central office, but by the nationality of the members (part-
ners) is vehemently rejected by the author, who speaks of
the "usual confusion," of "crude solutions," "absurd" de-
cisions, etc.7 Here, in the reviewer's opinion, he goes rather
too far. In some cases, particularly where it is necessary
to determine whether or not a company has enemy character,
it is incumbent on the investigator to draw aside the screen
of legal personality and to scrutinize the individuals who in
fact control the company.
The author also details the scope of the personal law
of a corporation which "accompanies the legal entity from
birth to death."8  That law determines whether a corpora-
tion has come into existence,9 furthers its capacity,o regulates
its internal organization," fixes its rights and duties in re-
4. Pp. 24-27.
5. P. 38.
6. See, however, pp. 63-65.
7. Pp. 56-62.
8. P. 68.
9. P. 64.
10. P. 71.
11. P. 74.
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spect to third persons, 12 and determines alterations of the
corporation's memorandum and articles, and its dissolution.'13
In particular the author discusses in detail the consequences
of Soviet nationalization of Russian companies abroad and
the consequences of the so-called "Litvinov agreement." The
decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the
Pink case, 14 which recognized the nationalization decrees is
rightly called by the author "a regrettable deviation from
well-settled principles of international law."' 5
An ensuing chapter deals with unincorporated business
organizations.6 The author lays justifiable stress on the
fact that there are many established "gradations" between
a mere contract of associates and a complete legal person.
This has long been recognized, and the term "relative legal
person" has been used to designate the commercial partner-
ship of German and Swiss law. It is certainly true that
all business organizations, whether incorporated or not, have
a personal law "at least to the extent that corporate attri-
butes attach to them.""17 In civil law countries the personal
law for partnerships and other unincorporated bodies is
determined by the "seat" or central office, just as in the
case of incorporated legal persons. As regards the United
States, the author, though with some reserve, considers that
the law under which the quasi-corporation has been organized
is probably that which is applicable to it. 18 He does not dis-
cuss the question in regard to England.
Attention is then given to the matter of the recognition,
as opposed to the creation, of corporations.:" The old con-
cept of a merely territorial effect of incorporation has been
replaced nearly everywhere, though not in Beale's work, by
a more liberal view. A corporation can exist outside the
country which creates it, but abroad it needs recognition, as
distinct from the constitution of a new personality. The
extent of recognition is determined by domestic law.20  The
12. P. 80.
13. P. 85.
14. United States v. Pink, 315 U. S. 203 (1942).
15. P. 90.
16. P. 93 et seq.
17. P. 100.
18. P. 113.
19. P. 124 et seq.
20. See especially p. 150 et seq. As to the English ultra vires doc-
trine, see p. 158 et seq.
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last chapter of the topic on corporations deals with the ad-
mission of foreign corporations to do business. This may
depend on special authorization, on registration, or on re-
ciprocity.
The second topic of Dr. Rabel's work deals with torts.
In furtherance of his doctrine of classification, the author
uses "comparative law" as a medium for his attempt to
establish a general notion of torts which will cover liability
for fault as well as liability for risk; which will even include
certain liabilities without fault which attend acts that are
permitted "on account of the superior interests" of the
actor ;21 but which will exclude violations of contractual duties
by the debtor. 22 It must be doubted whether a useful general
formula has been or can be found. Dr. Rabel says: "'Tort'
... in the meaning of the conflicts rule, is any unlawful in-
vasion of the interests of another person, causing damage or
harm to a person." 23  But that formula does not take us
very far, especially in view of Rabel's own wish to include
in the concept of tort certain acts "permitted" despite the
damage they cause.2 4 He tries to overcome the difficulty
by saying that such acts are lawful "only- in a formal or re-
stricted sense." But surely this statement is too vague to
constitute a real solution? Moreover, damaging acts may
be committed by the possessor of a thing who is not its
owner. The obligation to repair the damage may be in-
curred as a consequence either of a tort (the classification
in English law), or of the violation of a rei vindicaio-that
is, of a relation between two persons (as in German law)-
and therefore not a tort. There are other difficulties in the
case of acts that are lawful per se but create obligations if
done in misuse of a right (abus de droit).
The governing conflict rule in the case of torts is now
nearly everywhere the law of the place where the tort was
committed. The author's description of the predicament
caused by the unfortunate English decision in Machado v.
Fontes25 is very impressive. He also calls attention to the
"shocking results amounting to outright denial of justice"
21. P. 230.
22. P. 235.
23. Ibid.
24. P. 230.
25. [1897J 2 Q. B. 231.
19491
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
in the case of actions involving determination of title to land
and actions for trespassing on land.26
The two chapters on the scope of the governing rule and
on the "place of wrong" are particularly instructive, even
fascinating; but it is impossible in this short review to give
details. The topic on torts ends with a survey of maritime
and aeronautic torts.2 7
The third and final topic in this second volume deals
with contracts in general. With careful precision the author
illuminates the various systems prevailing in practice, legis-
lation, and doctrine. He strongly opposes the views of Beale
and the American Restatement, which favour the law of the
place of contracting, and he is no more inclined to agree
with Lorenzen's choice of the law of the place of perform-
ance. Dr. Rabel is undoubtedly right in stating that during
four centuries courts have "increasingly and with few inter-
ruptions" applied the doctrine that the intention of the con-
tracting parties governs the entire area of contractual obliga-
tions. That is what English lawyers mean when they use
the unsuitable expression "the proper law of the contract."
Dr. Rabel rightly emphasizes that all doctrines which deny
the autonomy of the contracting parties are inconsistent with
the unambiguous trend of decisions in nearly all countries
and particularly in the United States. The question is, how-
ever, whether the parties' autonomy is in any way restricted.
Rabel, after careful study of the practice of the courts in the
"mercantile countries" of England,. France and Germany,
considers that there are no restrictions-except where the
application of the chosen law would violate the ordre public
of the forum. The law chosen by the parties is to be applied
"with all its implications," and it would be wrong to resort
to any other law "solely because it would be applicable in
the absence of a party intention. ' ' 28 He refuses therefore
to distinguish between imperative and optional rules of the
law most closely concerned.
True, the courts have often expressed themselves to the
effect that "the proper law of the contract is the law which
the parties intended to apply," and that the "intention ex-
pressed in the contract will be conclusive." But phrases of
26. Pp. 246, 247.
27. P. 336 et seq.
28. P. 399.
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this kind, like all other generalizations, are inevitably to a
certain degree inexact. As Cheshire has shown in his recent
book on International Contracts, such statements are incon-
sistent with the main principle of private international law,
according to which every relationship is governed by that
law with which it has the closest connection. No court
would be prepared to sacrifice this principle to the autonomy
of the parties. iThe famous case on which Dr. Rabel relies
in particular is the Vita Food case, in which indeed the con-
tracting persons had expressly subjected their relationship
to English law, although their domicil, the place of contract-
ing, the place of destination, and the place of violation of
the contract pointed to Newfoundland, to New York, and to
Nova Scotia, and nothing showed a connection with Eng-
land. The Privy Council (per Lord Wright) declared that
the parties were in no way prevented from choosing what-
ever law they pleased, and that the only impediments that
might exist were lack of bona fides, illegality, and the public
order of the forum. This pronouncement however, is am-
biguous. What bona fides and illegality mean is not beyond
doubt. Is bona fidos lacking only where the declaration is
not genuine, that is, where it does not correspond to the true
intention of the parties? Or is it sufficient to establish maka
fides if the (genuine) declaration was made in order fraudu-
lently to evade some compulsory rule? And by what law is
the legality of the choice to be tested? The reviewer shares
the view of Professor Cheshire and Mr. J. H. C. Morris,
who sharply reject Lord Wright's formula. "It is scarcely
credible," says Cheshire "that [the decision] will survive
as an authority."30 Apart from the Vita Food decision, the
following proposition stands, as Cheshire's careful study
of the cases has shown: "Where the law expressly chosen by
the parties has been accepted by the court as the proper law
to govern the substance of the obligation, there has always
been some factual connection, and generally a substantial
connection, between the contract and the country of the
chosen law."3' 1 The same is true of the German decisions
mentioned by Melchior.32  In all the cases decided by the
29. Vita Food Products, Inc. v. Unus Shipping Co., [1939] A. C. 277.
30. INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS 33 (1948).
31. Ibid.
32. DiE GRUNDLAGEN DES DEUTSCHEx INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHTS
506 (1932).
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German Supreme Court or the German Appeal Courts the
parties had chosen a legal system with which the contract
had some connection. With regard to France, Batiffol's
analysis reaches the same result.33
Dr. Rabel's doctrine of unrestricted autonomy can also
be impugned by consideration of the following: It is beyond
doubt that a contract lacking all foreign elements cannot be
subjected by the parties to any foreign law rule by which
they would violate some imperative rule of domestic law.
For example, if two domiciled Englishmen conclude a con-
tract in England to be performed in England they cannot
evade the English rule of "consideration" by agreeing to
have their contract governed by French law (where con-
sideration plays no part). Can it be assumed that if the
contract had been concluded in England between an English-
man and a domiciled citizen of Nova Scotia (where consider-
ation is required as in England) they could agree on the
applicability of French law?
The author then examines theI law applicable where
there is no agreement (express or implied) by the parties.
His admirable formula announces that the task of the court
is "first, to state whether the individual facts of the con-
tract are colored by a certain law; if not, second, whether
the contract belongs to a class typically centering in a certain
country." 84 Westlake's famous formula, applicability of the
law with which the contract has the most real connection, 5 is
here developed into the more precise maxim that the court
has to discover "the most characteristic connection of an
individual contract and, certainly, that of the usual types of
business contracts." He discusses the two most important
"prima facie connecting factors": the lex loci contractus,
which prevails by virtue of a presumption in France, Bel-
gium, Spain and other countries belonging to the French
law family; and the lex loci solutionis, which, under Savig-
ny's influence, obtains in Germany and several American
jurisdictions and is often favoured in British courts.37 But
he emphasizes that even a rebuttable, i.e., a prima facie, rule
33. LES CONFLITS DE LOIS EN MATIERE DES CONTRATS 27-9 (1938).
34. P. 440.
35. WESTLAKE, A TREATISE ON PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 212(Bentwich ed. 1925).
36. P. 442.
37. Pp. 445-462.
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is too rigid to be helpful. On the other hand, following
Griswold, he sees a danger in the "unlimited dissolution of
fixed conflicts rules."38  "If we could do no better than refer
the courts to their own estimates of what is in every single
case the most closely connected law.., the judges would soon
fall back on their formulas."3 9 It is therefore not the single
contract but the single type of contract which should be
studied. Insurance, banking, sale of goods, and carriage con-
tracts may be distinguished under "rational rather than local
criteria."*
The succeeding chapter deals with the form of con-
tracts. Of particular interest is the author's attempt to
find an exact definition of the concept "form" for the pur-
pose of conflicts law. Form, so he claims, is "the external
side of the making of the contract, the expression as opposed
to the content of legal declarations. 4 0  Though sometimes
helpful, the formula does not remove doubts as to classifi-
cation. The term "external side" is a little vague. It may
have the same meaning as Zitelmann's more precise pro-
nouncement: "A legal provision concerns the form only if
the content of the contract remains the same whether the
provision is obeyed or not."41 Neither definition however is
potent enough to dissolve classification doubts. Consent by
an authority or by a third party may be regarded as per-
taining to form, as in English law, because it is something
"external" to the agreement, or may be substantive, as is
the law outside England. A prohibition to act through an
agent (which indubitably concerns substance) may be dis-
tinguished with Zitelmann from a prohibition to use a mes-
senger to declare intention. In most countries marriage
banns are part of the form; French law has good reasons
for taking a different view.
Dr. Rabel's next chapter, on the scope of the law of the
contract, abounds in particularly happy solutions. His last
chapter on the doctrine of public policy shows the author's
strong opposition to such practically unlimited use of that
doctrine as is to be found notably in Italy and in other
countries swayed by "Europe's darkest currents of national-
38. P. 481.
39. P. 482. (Italics supplied.)
40. P. 498.
41. 2 ZITELMANN, INTERNATIONALEs PRIVATRECHT 158 (1897-1912).
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ism. ' '4 2 Rightly, like Lewald and other scholars before him,
Dr. Rabel would like to see the ordre public clause restricted
to those branches of law which "have to serve public inter-
ests."
May the next volume of this admirable work soon be
accessible to all those who, like the reviewer, are grateful
for what the first two volumes have taught them.
Martin Wolfft
LEGAL BIBLIOGRAPHY AND THE USE OF LAW BOOKS. By Ar-
thur S. Beardsley* and Oscar C. Orman.** Brooklyn:
The Foundation Press, Inc., 2nd ed. 1947. Pp. xii, 653.
$6.00.
It is refreshing to find, in a book on legal bibliography
designed to assist law students and legal researchers, at least
a passing reference, where statutory construction is dis-
cussed, to the subject of legislative intent. The authors de-
vote one chapter to Legislation, wherein they say, "It is
sometimes desirable to trace a bill from its introduction to
final passage by the Congress."'  This faint recognition of
the importance of legislative history is an all too tentative
and timid step to be sure, but still a step in the right direc-
tion.
Any law library these days that feels it is complete when
it has provided the standard reports, digests, statutes and
treatises is indeed living in the good old days. And any law
school which neglects to prepare its students in the use of
"nonlegal legal material" as well as in the use of the con-
ventional research sources is turning out ill-equipped grad-
uates. Particularly are the graduates handicapped if they
find themselves involved in a question of federal law. More
and more the federal courts are relying on the legislative
history of a statute when interpreting it, and more and more
42. P. 556.
t All Souls College, Oxford University, Oxford, England. Formerly
Professor of Law, University of Berlin.
* Member, Washington Bar.
** Lecturer in Legal Bibliography, Washington University, St. Louis,
Missouri.
1. P. 63.
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